I would yield to Senator Corzine.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Mr. Secretary.

It’s been posited a bit that the Korean situation

is disturbing, troubling, not necessarily a crisis. I look at—

you look back at what happened in 1994, when Kim Il Sung—two

extraordinary things—one, actually, he turned to his wife and said,

‘‘What do you think about the MIAs,’’ and she said, ‘‘I think you

ought to do it,’’ and he said, ‘‘It’s done.’’ Now, that was some time ago.

In the meantime, things have gotten a lot worse in Korea, economically—

North Korea—and you know, the reports are that soldiers

coming back from—that are seen by our people, the South Koreans,

may be 100, 115 pounds, kids are half the size of what they

ought to be—and that the system is generally breaking down. Now,

you know, that’s been said.

From that, you then have to compare the mind of Kim Il Sung

to Kim Jong Il, and that we can’t do very well, because we don’t

have, presumably, the assets on the ground to be able to penetrate

that kind of thinking.

I always think it’s the better part of wisdom to assume that he’s

desperate. Why wouldn’t he be? He has the United States putting

him on the ‘‘axis of evil.’’ He has pressures from all around. He has

a fading economy. He is in his 60s; he has a legacy to worry about.

He’s not in touch with the rest of the world, watches CNN, video,

et cetera, but that really doesn’t help the influence that his military

brings upon him.

And so my general approach would be that if—would be to start

out—that it’s safest, from the United States’ foreign policy, to start

out by assuming that this is a real crisis, which you said it was.

You used the word ‘‘crisis.’’ Why not?

In other words, if the fuel rods are moved, and if they’re moved

by truck, we won’t detect it—who knows where they’ll go. That

could be happening as we talk. It could be happening in the next

two or three things.

So, two things. One is, time is not on our side. We may have a

very, very short time window if Kim Jong Il is in a certain state

of mind, he feels threatened, rebuffs the South Korean Foreign

Minister for whatever reason, and, you know, the Chinese aren’t

putting a lot of pressure on him, nobody’s putting a lot of pressure

on him, such that we are, and he’s got the bomb. Now, that’s—Iraq

doesn’t have the bomb, at least as—reportedly. And he does. That’s

all he’s got. That’s all he’s got for his people. That’s all he’s got to

leverage for his people, what he desperately has always wanted.

And back in 1994, I think it was about $5 billion coming from

the South Koreans, the Japanese, and the European economic community;

now it’s—and coming from the Japanese for previous

wrongdoings, and could be more. The prospect of a treaty with the

United States—I agree with Joe Biden, I think if the President said

this is important, if the American people began to understand,

which I think they could do pretty quickly, particularly if those fuel

rods are moved, the implications are well understood, that this

could develop very, very quickly, perhaps on the same time track

with Iraq, maybe just a little bit afterwards, but, anyway, very uncomfortably

for the United States, not something to be put off.

So my instinct is always to try to open the box, make the box

larger, not smaller; give more opportunities, not fewer; take risks

of diplomacy, as opposed to, sort of, holding back and saying we’ll

just wait, or we won’t talk with them, or we won’t talk with them

unless they do such and such.

Now, if you held out an agreement, a peace treaty agreement,

with them—you ask them to verifiably stop what they are doing on

a nuclear basis—but they had all of this economic aid, world approval,

a sudden change of their position, the status that perhaps

Kim Jong Il has sought all these years privately—we don’t know.

We don’t know what’s in the mind of either him or Hussein, in

some respects, two of the people that we know the least about.

Why is it not worth considering, sort of, a grander plan once

again? It might be rejected. On the other hand, in the offering of

it, we gain or we may cause him to think. And he needs the money,

and his people are starving, and that time is running out for him.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,

Mr. Secretary.